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THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF 
BUDDHIST TIBET 
R e b e cca R. Fren c h 
rom March 3 through March 7, 1994, The Divinity School, the Institute for the 
Advanced Study of Religion, and the Workshop on Buddhist Intellectual Practice of the 
University, hosted the Numata Conference on Religion and Law in Southeast Asia. 
The following is excerpted from a paper delivered on March 4, 1994. • 
In the effort to think anew about the 
relationship between secular law and 
Buddhist law, as well as the relationship 
between traditional and modern concepts of civic reli-
gion, I will present secular Tibetan law as it ex isted 
during the reign of the Dalai Lamas, a new and engaging 
topic in Buddhist studies. My first goal will be to discuss 
briefly the organization and administration of the Tibetan 
secular legal system, the roles of officials and legal represen-
tatives, some jurisprudential concepts and the law codes. 
A second focus will be to reorient our understanding 
of Buddhist law toward a more interpretive and actor-
centered framework . I will begin with a legal case, 
narrated by a Tibetan, which took place in Lhasa in the 
1940s and which will be presented in two parts. Each part 
will be followed by an exeges is of the questions I found 
myself asking as it was recounted, questions which came 
from my own presumptions and preconceptions as an 
American attorney with training in anthropology. Each of 
the answers to these questions builds part of the cultural 
backdrop in which this narrator actor operated as a legal 
actor- his use of myths, relations of power, concepts of 
t ime, space and personal identity, the legal rituals, history, 
religious principles, reasoning patterns, procedures, avail-
able roles, symbols-a backdrop which I call Legal 
Cosmology. It is my view that for each case at law, a par-
t icipant draws from this Legal Cosmology, these particular 
shared categories, social practices and concepts, and fore-
grounds them into presentations for a particular set of 
circumstances. 
My third endeavor will be to question the ways in 
which we are constructing our categories of meaning in 
this inquiry, in partic ular the t erms "re ligion," 
"Buddhism," "secular law," and "religious law." In attempt-
ing to reconsider and understand the modern con-
notations of these terms, I think that we will find layers 
of epistemological-indeed, even ontological- assump-
t ions about the nature of our inquiry which will help us 
to reflect on, and perhaps introduce new questions into, 
our exegetical and theoretical enterprise. 
I would like to begin with a story, edited from a verba-tim taped transcript of a Tibetan layman who worked 
• The cdicor is gra teft~lw Peter Gou.scludk, Divinity School Plt .D. student in rhe History of Heligions, for editinl! chis article from the original conference manuscript. 
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as a lega l representative in the capital city of Lhasa, in 
the 1940s. Kungo Tsewang Tamdin had been introduced 
to me, by the Director of the Tibetan Library in 
Dharmsala, India, as a very knowledgeable man who had 
handled cases in the government courts for the Vatican-
like state of Sakya, as well as for private clients. The 
conversations between Kungo Tsewang Tamdin and I 
spanned several years in the mid 1980s in Dharamsala. 
Here is a short excerpt: 
Every year in the same month, almost a thousand [Sa 
skya) monks traveled west from their home monastery 
in Khams [in eastern Tibet] to Ngor monastery in cen-
tra l Tibet to receive teachings from the Sa skya [high 
lamas]. When they came this long distance, they 
begged food and clothing along the way from the peo-
ple in the districts. 
[Now) one year !learned that a man and his friends 
had become very angry with [a large group of] monks 
[for their insistent begging) and after a fight, had killed 
two of them. This was a very terrible happening and 
became a well-known event in the entire area. 
Now, the person who had killed the monks was a 
member of the Tibetan army and so the local commu-
nity [where the inc ident occurred] sent a petition to 
the Tibetan Cabinet [in the government in Lhasa]. So 
the man [who had done the killing) was brought to 
that office in Lhasa and he was whipped with the "ini-
tial whip" by the guards of that office. 
Then two women who had known the murdered Sa 
skya monks well and were from their home village [in 
Khams in eastern Tibet] came to see me [at home) and 
asked that I would go into court for them. I said that I 
had nothing to appear to the court for. They asked me 
to appea l to the court for the sTong payment. For one 
ordinary monk, [they sa id) the payment is 9 rDo rshad, 
so for two monks it was 18 rDo tshad. [They said that) 
if the monks had robbed or fought [prior to the mur-
ders], then the amount of the sTong payment would be 
reduced. So, in response to the request of these wom-
en, I sa id that I would petition to the court office for 
them. 
So, I went to the office to the west of the city and 
found that there were two very important Tibetan offi -
cials acting as judges in this case. One was of the 
Cabinet Minister rank and the other was of the next 
lower rank. Instead of carrying a written petition with 
me, I just went to the office and made the request oral-
ly. After presenting the entire oral petition, the judges 
told me they would consider the cla im of the women 
and said that I should return when [all of the issues of] 
the case [had been] decided. 
Let's stop half way through this simple case. A lready, we 
understand many things about this case, but we under-
stand them through projections about our own legal 
system which may indeed be mis-understandings. In order 
to approximate what Tsewang Tamdin is representing as 
he understands it, we need to know a number of things 
about the Tibetan milieu, as he perceived them, such as: 
the meaning of the word sTong; how the monks and army 
officers were viewed in the society; when, how and for 
whom Tsewang Tamdin could intercede; who signs a doc-
ument and where; what language codes were used in each 
particular setting, etc. The ways in which actors fashion 
their own intersubjective meanings and narratives repre-
sent the heart of legal practice in this Buddhist soc iety. In 
the next section we will investigate just what those 
meanings and understand ings were for Tsewang Tamdin, 
and find perhaps that many of our presumptions are mis-
directed. 
THE CONCEPTS OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 
AND ILLUSION, THE COSMOS AND TIME 
T scwang Tamdin commented to me several times in reference to this case, that because the Tibetan legal 
system acknowledged the Buddhist threefold nature of 
reality, he was prepared for arguments shifting the 
rea lity/illusion frame of this incident from the appearance 
level of reality, the JJarikalpica in Sanskrit, to the relative 
or /Jaricantra level or to the final perfected level of reality, 
the parinispanna. When questioned as to what this meant, 
he responded that he was poised to find out that the facts 
as represented were not the real facts, that is, to find out 
that one or either of the monks were actually tulkus, rein-
carnations of their predecessors, or high level tantric 
masters which would have significantly changed their 
social value. He would not have been surprised tO have 
been told that the army officer was not what he appeared 
to be, ie., that he had some other religious identity. 
Arguments might be made that this incident was a 
karmic necess ity to burn off the bad seeds of the monks; it 
might be rationalized in the context of karma due to some 
previous relation between the part ies. He sa id that parties 
had argued that a dea th was not a dea th at all but a 
transmi ss ion of life to another be ing staged as a death . 
While doubting that these arguments would influence 
the judges in a murder case, Tibetan legal representatives 
had to be prepared for several possible reality hifts that 
foregrounded the Buddhist notion of the illusory nature 
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In Tibet, the occupation of the defendant in a murder case determines the venue of the trial. 
of this worldly life and the ultimate reality of perfected 
vision. 
The temporal dimensions of this case also markedly 
determined our narrator's approaches and responses. Fine 
distinctions made on the basis of the dates of particular 
statutory changes, so common in western law, are not 
strongly at issue here. We are not told in the story how 
long after the murder the case was reported or how long 
after that the defendant was in confinement, or even 
which statute applied because of when it took place. 
THE MANDALA OF THE LAW INCLUDING 
INSTITUTIONS, SPACE AND LEGAL UNITS 
How did Tsewang Tamdin understand the relation-ship between the site of the case and the central 
city courts? What were the spatial and temporal compo-
nents of these relations? Tsewang related these ideas to 
me, as many Tibetans had, using the root metaphor for 
the Tibetan cosmos, a mandala pattern. The Tibetan 
mandala presents the entire universe and all realms with-
in a single essential plan, representing at one and the 
same time the consistency of movement in/out and 
up/down, the cyclical nature of rebirth, reified social and 
spatial hierarchy, the universalized path of individual 
mental conscience and the ultimate union of the sacred 
and the secular in a single cosmic design. The mandala is 
also the root metaphor for the levels of the legal adminis-
tration in ever decreasing circles, from the outerlying 
districts of the plateau, to the district headquarters, to the 
governors offices, to the Cabinet in the capital city and, 
ultimately, the central godhead of the Dalai Lama. This 
form was repeated in Lhasa, for the central administration 
building which housed the ]o wo, the most famous sacred 
statue of the Sakyamuni Buddha in Tibet. Thus, mapping 
the legal system of Tibet in mandala form both integrated 
law into this pervasive religious schema and legitimized it 
with a symbol of cosmic integration. 
Why were the deaths of these two monks being han-
dled not in ecclesiastical but in governmental courts? 
Monastic institutions had their own court processes fol-
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lowing the Vinaya with appeal available, ultimately, to 
the Dalai Lama. Murder and a few other serious offenses 
committed by monks, resulted in their expulsion from the 
monastic community and their treatment in the secular 
courts. In Tibet, the occupation of the defendant in a 
murder case determines the venue of the trial. In this 
instance, the crime was committed by a member of the 
Army, so the local people were responsible for reporting 
the murder to the Cabinet in Lhasa which then assigned 
it to the Office of the Army. Because the Army held an 
ambiguous position in Tibetan society with its traditional 
rejection of war, its offices were located outside of the city 
and the central mandala of power. 
How does the Tibetan secular court system with its 
multiple levels of court-offices and standardized process of 
appeal compare to the hierarchical layering of legal insti-
tutions in the West? There are few similarities between 
the two systems. For example, most cases in Tibet could 
be started at any level including the Cabinet. At each 
level, there were several different types of procedures and 
a variety of forums for a plaintiff to approach. Petitioners 
had to reach consensus with the other party and with the 
adjudicators in that forum before a suit was joined, or 
taken up by the forum. Suits could travel up and down in 
the system, that is, they could go to the local headman, 
then to the Cabinet in official government procedures, 
then out to conciliation with a lama, then down to a 
stewart in a regional estate for decision, then back to the 
Cabinet for closure. But even when the Cabinet accepted 
a case that the parties had agreed to, the suit did not go 
forward without their consent and one of the parties 
could then start proceedings elsewhere. Flexibility, non-
decay, overlapping jurisdiction, and consensus to forums 
and procedures are among the many elements which 
make the Tibetan legal system dissimilar from our own 
and which make navigation through its channels so inter-
esting. Crimes of murder, as in this case, were the 
exception; they were routinely sent up through official 
channels of the Cabinet in Lhasa for referral out for trial 
at the appropriate upper level court, in this case the 
Most cases in Tibet ... could be continually reopened. Individuals and circumstances 
were presumed to be radically unique ... 
Office of the Army outside the city. However, even in 
murder cases, the forum could be contested and the court 
could not proceed without the appearance and participa-
tion of all parties to the trial. Tsewang Tamdin mentioned 
to me if they had refused to recognize his claim to the 
payments he would have objected to the venue. 
MORAL NARRATIVES AND MYTHS 
What did our narrator see as the relationship between Buddhism and a secular legal system? On 
the one hand, Tsewang Tamdin presented no clear divi-
sion between the religious and political realms or 
between administration and law in his conversations. 
Indeed, he presented inviolable connections, such as 
fusion of the Buddha in the form of the Dalai Lama, with 
the state and the Buddhist religion. Thus, the overarch-
ing picture is one of a unified cosmos represented by the 
mandalic form of a government under the Buddha. On 
the other hand, he clearly differentiated between the 
moral law from the Vinaya (which outlined the Buddha's 
rules and procedures for the monastery) and the law 
codes of the secular state government (for use in the gov-
ernment courts). Thus, he saw them simultaneously as 
one and the same, and as entirely distinct. 
When I asked Kungo Tamdin about the moral dimen-
sions of this case, he responded in several ways. First, he 
said, murder was the most important of the Ten Non-
Virtuous Acts and particularly consequential to one's 
karmic position when done in anger, as was the case here. 
Second, he stated that it was essential to make particular 
normative arguments in court. In this case, he had to 
argue that the two female petitioners were aware of the 
need to beneficially influence the future lives of the dead 
monks by performing the correct religious rituals and that 
this was their purpose in obtaining the money. Third, it 
was presumed that the judge officiating was considering 
the future life of the defendant when sanctioning. Indeed, 
in other cases like this one, the amputation of limbs or 
severing of tendons of the defendant was construed by the 
judges as the best punishment because it promoted prayer 
in this life by eliminating all occupations except that of a 
prayer-wheel spinning mendicant. Fourth, for Tsewang 
Tamdin and the other parties to this case, the Buddha 
stood as an ideal, a constant referential standard in the 
court for right ways of action. 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE MIND 
When I asked Tsewang Tamdin about the repertoire of concepts he used to frame his arguments in 
court that first day, he began with the caveat that Tibet 
had no legal concepts per se, only concepts from the 
Buddha. That said, he moved on in the course of our 
interviews to a variety of jurisprudential concepts perti-
nent in this case, such as the process of factoring by 
which all , acts including murder were assessed with 
respect to the object, the motivation, the act and the 
completion of the act. The importance of a mental con-
science, particularly one that recognized right conduct 
and moral self-regulation as the foundation of a moral 
society, was an essential characteristic to be established 
for any witness or party, proving that they were not, in the 
words of the law codes, "acting for their own benefit," 
that they were speaking honestly, that they were working 
to rehannonize themselves and the community and that 
they were acting responsibly for their household or com-
munity. A third point in this case was that citation to 
[Jrecedent carried no weight in Tibetan courts. Most cases 
in Tibet, Tsewang Tamdin explained, could be continually 
reopened, a feature he and others lauded. Individuals and 
circumstances were presumed to be radically unique, that 
is, not comparable to other persons or circumstances 
regardless of how apparently similar they were. Therefore, 
as a legal representative, he went into court without 
recourse to layers of previous interpretations. References 
at trial were made primarily to standards in the law codes 
and to factoring of the circumstances on the basis of the 
Buddhist principles. 
Feeling more situated within the Tibetan context, let's return to the Case of the Murdered Monks. Kungo 
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... ritualized procedures and documentary practices were the core of the Tibetan legal system ... 
Yet, they were never written down! 
Tsewang Tamden continues his story: 
Then sometime later I was called to the court. The 
secretary brought the final decision document outside 
and read it in front of the court waiting room [to all of 
the participants]. I was then given a notice to come 
back the day after tomorrow. 
On that day, the secretary of the court again read 
the decision and explained the court costs section and 
the payment of the sTong and all the many other pay-
ments required. Then the secretary asked all sides of 
the dispute to sign the decision document, including 
the army man/murderer and myself. So, at the bottom 
of the document, the murderer and I both signed and 
sealed the document. Then the secretary turned to the 
murderer and asked him for the sTong payment. 
He offered it and the secretary took the sTong pay-
ment from the murderer. From this payment of 18 rDo 
tshad, the [Head] secretary then subtracted the court 
costs and the ink fees for the [drafting] secretaries and 
handed the rest to me. There were three copies made 
of the document and I received one. After that I left, 
so that I did not find out about the other punishments 
given to the murderer. 
Then I went to see the two women who had asked 
me to represent them. I gave them all the remaining 
money and later they used it all for the funeral rites 
and for other religious rituals for the future lives of the 
monks. I then took an account from these women of 
what they had spent and the offerings that they made 
and sent the receipt for this to their home district. 
Usually, the sTong payment goes to the relatives, but 
this time the only people who knew the monks and 
claimed the payments were these two women, so it 
went to them. That was the end [of it]. 
Once again, we find ourselves faced with questions which 
bring us to face our own assumptions. 
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THE RITUALS OF THE GOLDEN YOKE 
INCLUDING LANGUAGE AND ROLES 
What ki.nds o~ ritual processes were available in a case ltke thts? There were at least four distinct 
types of ritualized legal processes in Tibet: ( 1) visiting an 
official at home, (2) an official court procedure (which 
had over forty-four intricate steps), (3) conciliation 
(which was a distinct area of procedure with its own his-
tory and vocabulary) and ( 4) other less ·formal rituals 
such as rolling dice, plunging your hand in hot oil or 
water, or visiting an oracle and swearing before a deity. 
When the two women first visited our narrator, they 
used the first form of these ritual procedures and saw him 
at home. The actual trial before the Army court was an 
official court process (the second form mentioned above) 
which Tsewang described in only brief detail in this case. 
These ritualized procedures and documentary practices 
were the core of the Tibetan legal system throughout all 
the territories of the plateau. Yet, they were never written 
down! 
What were the roles in the secular legal system and to 
whom were they available? What did legal representatives 
have to know to be skilled at their job? The courtroom 
personnel for an official trial like this consisted of at least 
two (usually three or more) judges, several clerks, a care-
taker to announce the case, and often several helpers. 
Most offices in Tibet were staffed by at least one monk 
official and one lay official; in courts, these two officials 
were the judges. The lay official positions were filled by 
sons of nobles, sons of clerks for the larger families and 
sons of private land owners who encouraged their chil-
dren to get an education. Monk official positions were 
filled with sons from the elite noble class and non-elite 
trainees of all social levels who had entered the 
monastery early and had proven to be particularly smart 
and skilled. The role of conciliator was available to any 
individual with wealth, religious devotion or good admin-
istration skills. Other less formal rituals-rolling dice, 
visiting an oracle and swearing before a deity-were 
arranged by a vadety of specialized practitioners. 
Language plays a vital role in the structuring, processing and winning of law suits in Tibet. 
Language plays a vital role in the structuring, process-
ing and winning of law suits in Tibet. Forensic skill was 
thought by Tibetans to be intimately related to Tibetan 
Buddhist monastic debate and particularly Buddhist rea-
soning styles. Many of the important legal representatives 
in Lhasa were either monks or individuals with some reli-
gious training. Because he was not monastically trained, 
Tsewang Tamdin emphasized the other important legal 
repertoire-knowledge of the law codes and the use of 
ancient proverbs and phrases, many of which derived 
from the ancient law codes. 
Why was the murderer signing a final judicial docu-
ment and proffering money in court? The concept of 
consent to forums was also applied, in Tibet, to consent 
to the actual decision made in a case. Tsewang Tamdin 
stated that as the representative of the community of the 
victims, he, the murderer and the other parties had to 
first listen to and then read the complete statement of the 
facts and the decision of the court. At that point, they 
were expected to state any objections to the decision 
which they might have. Then, given their consent and 
consensus, the parties, even those to a murder trial, were 
expected to sign the document to indicate their agree-
ment to the final decision. Our narrator saw this process 
as natural and not requiring an explanation, so I will have 
to speculate about a few possible reasons for it. First, it 
insured the penetration of the individual mental con-
science of a party, which was the true center of all 
decision-making and social control in Tibet. Second, for 
a society with very little sanctioning power, it provided 
some contractual (rather than penal) assurance that the 
decision would be followed. Third, it impressed upon the 
criminal the nature of his crime and the punishments 
which he would have to accept. The "initial whip" given 
by the guards when the defendant arrived was thought by 
Tibetans to be a punishment which impressed upon the 
criminal the severity of his or her acts and insured the 
mindfulness necessary to keep him or her from repeating 
the crime. 
THE GRAMMAR OF THE LAW 
W hat ~oes t~1is story t~ll us ~bout the Tibetan law code. Dunng other mtervtews, Tsewang Tamdin 
read and discussed sections of the Tibetan law codes with 
me as did other officials. However, most of my informa-
tion for this response comes from collecting, compiling, 
translating and annotating these texts myself with a for-
mer Tibetan monk official, Kungo Thubten Sangye. 
Two points about the law codes are important to men-
tion at this juncture: the law codes did not contain any 
legal rules in the strong, formal, command-prescriptive 
sense that we use that term. It strikes me that it is quite 
possible that the Tibetan use of "weak rules," if I may call 
them that, will be revelatory of how rules, particularly 
legal rules, work in general. A second point is that their 
law codes also did not contain any detailed rendering of 
the four types of ritual legal procedure mentioned above, 
arguably the most important aspect of Tibetan law. This is 
an astonishing finding considering our western notions of 
the centrality and power of legal procedures and law 
codes. Legal procedure could only be collected in Tibet 
through individual stories and case. studies, not through 
the law codes. 
But how is it, finally, that the two women from the 
monks' village, laypeople from an outlying area without a 
formal education, not only know about the sTong victim 
compensation payments listed in the law codes but knew 
how much the payments should be, who should receive 
them and how one should go about t)etitioning for them 
during a trial? The sTong system, one of the most distin-
guishing features of the law codes, was a nine-part 
ranking system, by social and economic status, of all of 
the individuals in Tibetan society from the Dalai Lama, 
who ranked above the highest of the high, to 
hermaphrodites and beggars who ranked below the lowest 
of the low. Once the amount of the sTong was determined 
from the victim's social level, it became the central figure 
from which other payments could be calculated, such as 
the degree of physical injury from the wound. The Case of 
the Murdered Monks demonstrates both the layperson's 
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knowledge of the sTong system ranking and its actual 
operation and yet we are left with the question, how is it 
that the average illiterate layperson had such a detailed 
knowledge of information contained in the law codes? 
Tsewang T'lmdin's answer was that much of the law codes 
were generally known because they were compilations of 
Tibetan customs. 
This concludes our exegesis of the case. I would like to shift to a brief consideration of some of the concepts 
which I have been using for the case analysis to question 
the epistemological and other assumptions upon which 
these constructed categories of meaning are based. 
Talal Asad in his latest book, Genealogies of Religion, 
posits that terms such as "religion," "ritual" and "secular", 
as they are currently employed in the literature, have 
become culture-specific, modern constructs. The liberal 
humanist principles of the Enlightenment changed the 
meaning of these constructs by positing a mobile, creative 
human actor who could actively engage in building a 
modern secular nation state. Thus, the modern under-
standing of these terms compresses and encodes several 
(foundational) assumptions such as the idea of self-consti-
tution and self-choice, the strict division between the 
religious and secular spheres, autonomy, personal con-
sciousness, agency, teleological narratives, progressive 
time and modern historicity. Given these encoded 
assumptions, the contemporary Christian understanding of 
religious ritual is as a symbolic repetitive act. The pre-
modern Christian religious ritual, Asad argues, based on 
a different ontology and epistemology, was understood as 
a prescribed set of practices or performances which 
depended on individual discipline and ability to guide the 
initiate to the virtuous moral self. Asad's insights are 
clearly relevant to Buddhist religious ritual. Hence, the 
Buddhist religion of premodern times must be analyzed 
without the modern assumptions of protean transforma-
tion of self, the fractured world, decentered communities 
and the creative, individuated, autonomous actor. 
A similar concern can be expressed about the modern 
use of the word "law," which covers a wide panoply of 
characteristics from generalized social control mecha-
nisms in society, justice, forms of reasoning, fairness and 
rules, to bureaucratic institutions, professional decision-
makers, courts and sanctions. Modern models of legal 
systems such as Luhmann and Tuebner's autopoeisis the-
ory, which depicts law as a detached system of authorita-
tive regulation with an "essentially self-referential system 
of communication that is cognitively open and norma-
tively closed," are part of our own modern mythic 
constructs about the nature of institutions in complex 
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societies. While these models may be of some value to 
sociologists and scholars of modern legal systems, they 
provide very little guidance as to the nature of legal prac-
tice in pre-modern Buddhist countries. 
How then should we go about understanding what we 
mean when we ask questions about the movement of 
"Buddhist law" across South Asia or the reception or 
development of "secular law" within a Buddhist country 
like Tibet? How can we avoid using terms that are already 
loaded with modern meaning? One approach is to begin 
with cases-circumstances which are temporally and 
socially contextualized. For example, in response to the 
question about "secular law" in Buddhist Tibet, it is possi-
ble to say that in the 1930s and 1940s, among individuals 
such as Tsewang Tamdin, the legal system was not sepa-
rate or in any way in opposition to the worldview of the 
Buddha except perhaps to the extent that a judge 
appeared to violate a Buddhist value. Instead, there was 
the realm of society, wholly interpenetrated by and with 
the religion of the Buddha, and within this realm were a 
set of social institutions and practices demarcated as king 
laws. This area was in consonance with the Vinaya in 
that it was viewed as being based entirely on the Vinaya 
and it included Buddhist means of factoring and Buddhist 
forms of reasoning. But the kings laws were also definitely 
not "Buddhist law" in that they were not for monks, but 
for laypeople. They had a different historical develop-
ment that was not considered part of the Tibetan relig-
ious canon. So, in the capital city of Lhasa, there was no 
real secular sphere, as the term "secular" is understood in 
modern, western societies. 
This then is a single constructed picture of the rela-
tionship between the religious and secular legal spheres in 
Tibet in the 1940s. Building from many such cases, one 
can form this part of the Tibetan Legal Cosmology. How 
then does comparison take place? Buddhist law and kings' 
law in pre-modern Tibet do not match the modern dis-
tinction between religious law and secular law but it 
might match quite well constructed cosmologies of law in 
other pre-modern Buddhist societies. Contrasting richly 
contextualized pictures, an exercise in comparative posi-
tionality, if you will, both allows for a thicker definition 
and representation of the material that we wish to com-
pare, and presents a possible antidote to the paralyzing 
effects of a deconstructionist project which tends to rela-
tivize and delegitimize the large, comparative questions. o 
